Observability and lying

Tilman Fries; Uri Gneezy; Agne Kajackaite; Daniel Parra

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.038

Observability and lying

Tilman Fries
, Uri Gneezy
, Agne Kajackaite
, Daniel Parra

WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Rady School of Management
University of Amsterdam

Producción: Contribución a una revista › Artículo › revisión exhaustiva

26 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

Experimental participants in a cheating game draw a random number and then report any number they wish, receiving a monetary payoff based only on the report. We study how these reports depend on the level of observability of both the random draw and the report by the experimenter. Our results show that whereas increasing the observability of the random draw decreases cheating, increasing the anonymity of the reports does not affect average reports.

Idioma original	Inglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)	132-149
Número de páginas	18
Publicación	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volumen	189
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.038
Estado	Publicada - sep. 2021
Publicado de forma externa	Sí

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10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.038

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title = "Observability and lying",

abstract = "Experimental participants in a cheating game draw a random number and then report any number they wish, receiving a monetary payoff based only on the report. We study how these reports depend on the level of observability of both the random draw and the report by the experimenter. Our results show that whereas increasing the observability of the random draw decreases cheating, increasing the anonymity of the reports does not affect average reports.",

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AU - Kajackaite, Agne

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AB - Experimental participants in a cheating game draw a random number and then report any number they wish, receiving a monetary payoff based only on the report. We study how these reports depend on the level of observability of both the random draw and the report by the experimenter. Our results show that whereas increasing the observability of the random draw decreases cheating, increasing the anonymity of the reports does not affect average reports.

KW - Cheating

KW - Double blind

KW - Laboratory experiment

KW - Lying

KW - Observability

KW - Social image

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Observability and lying

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