Domestic Contestation and Presidential Prerogative in Colombian Foreign Policy

Tom Long, SebastiÁn Bitar, Gabriel JimÉnez-PeÑa

Producción: Contribución a una revistaArtículorevisión exhaustiva

2 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

The study of Colombian foreign policy emphasises external constraints and presidential prerogative in foreign policymaking. Drawing on insights from recent foreign policy analysis literature and evidence from several cases (Plan Colombia, US military bases, free trade talks with China, and ICJ arbitration of a maritime border with Nicaragua), this article challenges commonplace presidentialist assumptions. A novel model of ‘contested presidentialism’ better captures how Colombian domestic actors mobilise to raise political costs to block or modify presidential preferences. When the opposition fails to raise costs, presidentialist assumptions apply. Otherwise, presidents respond strategically by abandoning policies or substituting second-best alternatives.

Idioma originalInglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)466-482
Número de páginas17
PublicaciónBulletin of Latin American Research
Volumen39
N.º4
DOI
EstadoPublicada - 01 sep. 2020

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