A note on “Evolution of Preferences”

Oliver Pardo

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.05.005

A note on “Evolution of Preferences”

Oliver Pardo

Departamento de Administración

Producción: Contribución a una revista › Artículo › revisión exhaustiva

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Resumen

A surprising result in Dekel et al. (2007) states that strict Nash equilibria might cease to be evolutionary stable when agents are able to observe a signal that fully reveals the opponent's preferences, even if the frequency of the signal is very low. I show that when the signal a player receives on her opponent's preferences is almost uninformative, all strict Nash equilibria are evolutionary stable, no matter the frequency of the signal.

Idioma original	Inglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)	129-134
Número de páginas	6
Publicación	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volumen	71
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.05.005
Estado	Publicada - ago. 2017

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.05.005

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title = "A note on “Evolution of Preferences”",

abstract = "A surprising result in Dekel et al. (2007) states that strict Nash equilibria might cease to be evolutionary stable when agents are able to observe a signal that fully reveals the opponent's preferences, even if the frequency of the signal is very low. I show that when the signal a player receives on her opponent's preferences is almost uninformative, all strict Nash equilibria are evolutionary stable, no matter the frequency of the signal.",

keywords = "Efficiency, Evolution of Preferences, Indirect evolutionary approach",

author = "Oliver Pardo",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2017",

month = aug,

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AB - A surprising result in Dekel et al. (2007) states that strict Nash equilibria might cease to be evolutionary stable when agents are able to observe a signal that fully reveals the opponent's preferences, even if the frequency of the signal is very low. I show that when the signal a player receives on her opponent's preferences is almost uninformative, all strict Nash equilibria are evolutionary stable, no matter the frequency of the signal.

KW - Efficiency

KW - Evolution of Preferences

KW - Indirect evolutionary approach

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85033395907

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DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.05.005

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JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

ER -

A note on “Evolution of Preferences”

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