TY - JOUR
T1 - A note on “Evolution of Preferences”
AU - Pardo, Oliver
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2017/8
Y1 - 2017/8
N2 - A surprising result in Dekel et al. (2007) states that strict Nash equilibria might cease to be evolutionary stable when agents are able to observe a signal that fully reveals the opponent's preferences, even if the frequency of the signal is very low. I show that when the signal a player receives on her opponent's preferences is almost uninformative, all strict Nash equilibria are evolutionary stable, no matter the frequency of the signal.
AB - A surprising result in Dekel et al. (2007) states that strict Nash equilibria might cease to be evolutionary stable when agents are able to observe a signal that fully reveals the opponent's preferences, even if the frequency of the signal is very low. I show that when the signal a player receives on her opponent's preferences is almost uninformative, all strict Nash equilibria are evolutionary stable, no matter the frequency of the signal.
KW - Efficiency
KW - Evolution of Preferences
KW - Indirect evolutionary approach
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85033395907&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.05.005
DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.05.005
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85033395907
SN - 0304-4068
VL - 71
SP - 129
EP - 134
JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics
JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics
ER -