Élites Agrarias y Concentración de la Clase Política en Chile

La reforma agraria chilena de los años 1960s y 1970s responde a la combinación de demandas locales por mayor redistribución de la riqueza con la implementación de una nueva política exterior estadounidense, la cual buscaba desalentar la expansión de la revolución cubana al resto de América Latina ADDIN CSL_CITATION {"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Welch Jr.","given":"Richard E.","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"id":"ITEM-1","issued":{"date-parts":[["1985"]]},"publisher":"University of North Carolina Press","publisher-place":"Chapel Hill","title":"Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution 1959-1961","type":"book"},"uris":["http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=a554328f-87fb-41a4-88e6-04f10a3a690a"]},{"id":"ITEM-2","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1111/j.1471-0366.2007.00143.x","ISBN":"1471-0358","ISSN":"1471-0358","abstract":"This article, which is published in two parts, is an empirical analysis of the Chilean agrarian reform (1964–1973) and ‘partial’ counter-agrarian reform (1974–1980). Its aim is to explain and interpret their logic and the changes they brought to Chile’s agrarian property regime in particular and Chilean life in general. Chile’s agrarian reform was successful in expropriating (under the Frei and Allende administrations, 1964–1973) the great estates of the hacienda landed property system. The capitalist ‘partial’ counter-reform then redistributed them (under the military, 1974–1980). CORA, the country’s agency for agrarian reform, expropriated and subsequently redistributed 5809 estates of almost 10 million hectares, or 59 per cent of Chile’s agricultural farmland. A large amount of the expropriated land (41 per cent) benefited 54,000 peasant households with small-sized family farms and house-sites. The rest of the farmland benefited efficient and competitive commercial farmers and agro-business and consolidated medium-sized farms. Of central concern is the role of the agrarian reform and subsequent ‘partial’ counter-reform processes in fostering the transformation of the erstwhile agrarian structure of the hacienda system toward agrarian capitalism. The redistribution of the agricultural land previously expropriated made possible the formation of an agro-industrial bourgeoisie, small commercial farmers, an open land market and a dynamic agricultural sector. While, however, under military rule, a selected few benefited with family farms and became independ- ent agricultural producers, a large majority of reformed and non-reformed campesinos were torn from the land to become non-propertied proletarians in a rapidly modernizing but highly exclusionary agricultural sector.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Bellisario","given":"Antonio","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"Journal of Agrarian Change","id":"ITEM-2","issue":"2","issued":{"date-parts":[["2007","4"]]},"page":"1-34","title":"The Chilean Agrarian Transformation: Agrarian Reform and Capitalist 'Partial' Counter-Agrarian Reform, 1964-1980. Part 1: Reformism, Socialism and Free-Market Neoliberalism","type":"article-journal","volume":"7"},"uris":["http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=5ef6ead5-8510-46c0-a0f4-8bd3ed515f18"]},{"id":"ITEM-3","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1111/j.1471-0366.2007.00138.x","ISBN":"1471-0358","ISSN":"1471-0358","abstract":"This article, which is published in two parts, is an empirical analysis of the Chilean agrarian reform (1964–1973) and ‘partial’ counter-agrarian reform (1974–1980). Its aim is to explain and interpret their logic and the changes they brought to Chile’s agrarian property regime in particular and Chilean life in general. Chile’s agrarian reform was successful in expropriating (under the Frei and Allende administrations, 1964–1973) the great estates of the hacienda landed property system. The capitalist ‘partial’ counter-reform then redistributed it (under the military, 1974–1980). CORA, the country’s agency for agrarian reform, expropriated and subsequently redistributed 5809 estates of almost 10 million hectares, or 59 per cent of Chile’s agricultural farmland. A large amount of the expropriated land (41 per cent) benefited 54,000 peasant households with small-sized family farms and house-sites. The rest of the farmland benefited efficient and competitive commercial farmers and agro-business and consolidated medium-sized farms. Of central concern is the role of the agrarian reform and subsequent ‘partial’ counter-reform processes in fostering the transformation of the erstwhile agrarian structure of the hacienda system toward agrarian capitalism. The redistribution of the agricultural land previously expropriated made possible the formation of an agro-industrial bourgeoisie, small commercial farmers, an open land market and a dynamic agricultural sector. While, however, under military rule, a selected few benefited with family farms and became independent agricultural producers, a large majority of reformed and non-reformed campesinos were torn from the land to become non-propertied proletarians in a rapidly modernizing but highly exclusionary agricultural sector. Α","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Bellisario","given":"Antonio","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"Journal of Agrarian Change","id":"ITEM-3","issue":"2","issued":{"date-parts":[["2007","1"]]},"page":"145-182","title":"The Chilean Agrarian Transformation: Agrarian Reform and Capitalist 'Partial' Counter-Agrarian Reform, 1964-1980. Part 2: CORA, Post-1980 Outcomes and the Emerging Agrarian Class Structure","type":"article-journal","volume":"7"},"uris":["http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=22ac4d38-dcbd-4f6d-bfeb-9523cf351db4"]},{"id":"ITEM-4","itemData":{"ISBN":"8483402785","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Garrido R.","given":"José","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Guerrero Y.","given":"Cristián","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Valdés","given":"María Soledad","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"id":"ITEM-4","issued":{"date-parts":[["1988"]]},"publisher":"Editorial Universitaria","publisher-place":"Santiago de Chile","title":"Historia de la reforma agraria en Chile","type":"book"},"uris":["http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=7c3c2f41-c068-401b-a5f7-67a18dd822a3"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"(Welch Jr. 1985; Bellisario 2007b, 2007a; Garrido R., Guerrero Y., y Valdés 1988)","plainTextFormattedCitation":"(Welch Jr. 1985; Bellisario 2007b, 2007a; Garrido R., Guerrero Y., y Valdés 1988)","previouslyFormattedCitation":"(Welch Jr. 1985; Bellisario 2007b, 2007a; Garrido R., Guerrero Y., y Valdés 1988)"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}(Welch Jr. 1985; Bellisario 2007b, 2007a; Garrido R., Guerrero Y., y Valdés 1988). La reforma comenzó a mediados de la década de 1960 durante el gobierno de Eduardo Frei Montalva y fue abruptamente terminada, y parcialmente revertida, a partir de 1973 con el golpe de estado contra Salvador Allende y la instauración de la dictadura de Augusto Pinochet. La reforma establecía que predios que excedían 80 hectáreas de riego básico (HRB) eran sujetas a expropiación[1]. Los terratenientes originales tenían derecho a mantener un predio de no más de 80 HRB. En total, 7,2 millones de hectáreas físicas fueron expropiadas, correspondientes al 22% de la superficie del país. De estas, 31% fueron devueltas íntegramente a sus dueños originales durante la contra reforma mediante un proceso de revocación de expropiaciones. Este contexto histórico ha permitido estudiar una serie de preguntas respecto a los efectos de una gran redistribución de activos como es la tierra. Una de las hipótesis más influyentes es la de la relación negativa entre desigualdad de la tierra y desarrollo. Esta es comúnmente referida como la hipótesis de Engerman y Sokoloff, la cual estipula que ciertos factores geográficos y climáticos, así como la densidad poblacional precolombina, fueron factores importantes en la determinación de los tipos de cultivos y la actividad económica que los colonizadores realizaron. En lugares donde los cultivos favorecidos fueron los cultivos con economías de escala, se observa una mayor desigualdad de la tierra y esto conlleva peores instituciones ADDIN CSL_CITATION {"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"DOI":"10.3386/h0066","ISBN":"0804727376 (alk. paper)\\r0804727384 (pbk. alk. paper)","ISSN":"0022-0507","abstract":"Many scholars are concerned with why the U.S. and Canada have been so much more successful over time than other New World economies. Since all New World societies enjoyed high levels of product per capita early in their histories, the divergence in paths can be traced back to the achievement of sustained economic growth by the U.S. and Canada during the 18th to early 19th centuries. This paper highlights the relevance of differences in the degree of inequality in wealth, human capital, and political power in accounting for the variation in the records of growth, and suggest that the roots of inequality lay in differences in the initial factor endowments of the respective colonies The large concentration of Native Americans, and the suitability of cultiva- ting sugar and other crops were key in generating extreme inequality. This encouraged the evolution of societies where small elites of European descent held highly disproportionate shares of the wealth, human capital and political power, and dominated the population economically and politically. Absent from the nearly all-inclusive list of New World colonies with these conditions were the British settlements in the northern part of the North American continent. Next, we discuss the tendencies of government policies to maintain these conditions along the respective economy's path of development. Finally, we explore the effects of inequality on the evolution of institutions conducive to participation in the commercial economy, markets and technological change during this specific era, and suggest that their greater equality in wealth, human capital, and political capital and power may have predisposed the U.S. and Canada toward earlier realization of sustained economic growth.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Engerman","given":"Stanley L","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Sokoloff","given":"Kenneth L","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"How Latin America Fell Behind","id":"ITEM-1","issued":{"date-parts":[["1997"]]},"page":"260-304","title":"Factor endowments, institutions, and differential paths of growth among new world economies","type":"article"},"uris":["http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=eeb9483c-63d6-4001-9d96-b6d347ef6d17"]},{"id":"ITEM-2","itemData":{"author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Sokoloff","given":"Kenneth L.","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Engerman","given":"Stanley L.","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"Journal of Economic Perspectives","id":"ITEM-2","issue":"3","issued":{"date-parts":[["2000"]]},"page":"217-232","title":"History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World","type":"article-journal","volume":"14"},"uris":["http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=ca9ee2e4-0ff1-445b-8ed4-36b76f466539"]},{"id":"ITEM-3","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1162/REST_a_00218","ISBN":"0034-6535","ISSN":"0034-6535","abstract":"Abstract Levels of development vary widely within countries in the Americas. We argue that part of this variation has its roots in the colonial era, when colonizers engaged in different economic activities in different regions of a country. We present evidence consistent with the view that “bad” activities (those that depended heavily on labor exploitation) led to lower economic development today than “good” activities (those that did not rely on labor exploitation). Our results also suggest that differences in political representation (but not in income inequality or human capital) could be the intermediating factor between colonial activities and current development.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Bruhn","given":"Miriam","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Gallego","given":"Francisco A.","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"Review of Economics and Statistics","id":"ITEM-3","issue":"2","issued":{"date-parts":[["2012","5"]]},"page":"433-461","title":"Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial Activities: Do They Matter for Economic Development?","type":"article-journal","volume":"94"},"uris":["http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=08695841-a1e6-4b9b-89a8-0f6fd44b6423"]},{"id":"ITEM-4","itemData":{"abstract":"We exploit differences in European mortality rates to estimate the effect of institu- tions on economic performance. Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. These institutions persisted to the present. Exploiting differences in European mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions, we estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita. Once the effect of institutions is controlledfor, countries in Africa or those closer to the equator do not have lower income.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Acemoglu","given":"Daron","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Johnson","given":"Simon","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Robinson","given":"James A.","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"The American Economic Review","id":"ITEM-4","issue":"5","issued":{"date-parts":[["2001"]]},"page":"1369-1401","title":"The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation","type":"article-journal","volume":"91"},"uris":["http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=aee98725-49c7-4755-9811-56b8b07061f5"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"(Engerman y Sokoloff 1997; Sokoloff y Engerman 2000; Bruhn y Gallego 2012; Acemoglu, Johnson, y Robinson 2001)","plainTextFormattedCitation":"(Engerman y Sokoloff 1997; Sokoloff y Engerman 2000; Bruhn y Gallego 2012; Acemoglu, Johnson, y Robinson 2001)","previouslyFormattedCitation":"(Engerman y Sokoloff 1997; Sokoloff y Engerman 2000; Bruhn y Gallego 2012; Acemoglu, Johnson, y Robinson 2001)"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}(Engerman y Sokoloff 1997; Sokoloff y Engerman 2000; Bruhn y Gallego 2012; Acemoglu, Johnson, y Robinson 2001). En particular, los autores de esta propuesta han explorado ciertos aspectos de la hipótesis de Engerman y Sokoloff. ADDIN CSL_CITATION {"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"abstract":"This paper uses unique historical data on the Chilean land reform of the 1960s and 1970s to estimate the impact that redistribution had on land inequality, crop choice, and development. In a panel fixed effects estimation with a continuous treatment, I show that land redistribution had a persistent negative effect on land inequality, and that areas treated with more redistribution increased their share of land cultivated with vineyards, and lowered the share of land destined to forest plantations. I also find evidence supporting the beneficial welfare effects of land reform through its effect on increasing human capital, public infrastructure, and private dwelling quality. The fact that a military coup interrupted the reform process allows for the comparison of the effects of reform and counter-reform, which sheds light on the mechanisms through which redistribution operated. I find that the switch to vineyards and away from forestry is driven by the size constraint and not the owner’s type.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Lillo Bustos","given":"Nicolás A.","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"id":"ITEM-1","issue":"September","issued":{"date-parts":[["2018"]]},"title":"Land Redistribution and Crop Choice: Evidence from Reform and Counter-Reform in Chile","type":"article"},"uris":["http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=38a880e7-5de6-4e74-bcce-c7f4a2f641a2"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"(Lillo Bustos 2018)","manualFormatting":"Lillo (2018)","plainTextFormattedCitation":"(Lillo Bustos 2018)","previouslyFormattedCitation":"(Lillo Bustos 2018)"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}Lillo (2018) explora los efectos de la reforma sobre el tipo de cultivo, la desigualdad de la tierra y los efectos de la reforma en el largo plazo sobre la educación y ciertas medidas de riqueza personal. Los resultados muestran que la redistribución reduce la desigualdad de la tierra en el largo plazo, así como un cambio en el tipo de cultivo hacia viñedos, mientras que la contra reforma aumenta la proporción de plantaciones forestales. Los resultados también muestran un aumento en la proporción de personas con educación primaria y mejoras en algunos indicadores de riqueza. Es así como se muestra que una intervención humana puede en parte contrarrestar una parte de la hipótesis de Engerman y Sokoloff, en particular la relacionada a la relación entre desigualdad y tipo de cultivo. ADDIN CSL_CITATION {"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.02.001","ISBN":"9789292303969","ISSN":"03043878","abstract":"This paper studies how land reform and population growth affect land inequality and landlessness, focusing particularly on indirect effects owing to their influence on household divisions and land market transactions. Theoretical predictions of a model of household division and land transactions are successfully tested using household panel data from West Bengal spanning 1967-2004. The tenancy reform lowered inequality through its effects on household divisions and land market transactions, but its effect was quantitatively dominated by inequality-raising effects of population growth. The land distribution program lowered landlessness but this was partly offset by targeting failures and induced increases in immigration. © 2014 Elsevier B.V.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Bardhan","given":"Pranab","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Luca","given":"Michael","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Mookherjee","given":"Dilip","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Pino","given":"Francisco","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"Journal of Development Economics","id":"ITEM-1","issued":{"date-parts":[["2014"]]},"page":"171-190","publisher":"Elsevier B.V.","title":"Evolution of land distribution in West Bengal 1967-2004: Role of land reform and demographic changes","type":"article-journal","volume":"110"},"uris":["http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=1e1cb5cf-b0b3-41ba-a088-4e34531686ea"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"(Bardhan et al. 2014)","manualFormatting":"Bardhan et al. (2014)","plainTextFormattedCitation":"(Bardhan et al. 2014)","previouslyFormattedCitation":"(Bardhan et al. 2014)"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}Bardhan et al. (2014) se enfocan en cómo cambios demográficos interactúan con reformas agrarias para afectar la desigualdad de la tierra. Usando el caso de las reformas de tenencia de la tierra en Bengal Occidental. Desarrollan un modelo y testean las hipótesis correspondientes, en las cuales encuentran que la división de hogares inducida por la reforma contrarresta en parte la reducción en la desigualdad de la tierra que es producto del efecto directo de la reforma. ADDIN CSL_CITATION {"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1257/app.20160262","ISSN":"1945-7782","abstract":"We examine intra-household gender-differentiated effects of property rights securitisation following West Bengal’s tenancy registration program, using two independently gathered datasets. In both samples, higher program implementation increased male child survival rates in families without a firstborn son, but not in those that already have a firstborn male child. We argue this reflects intensified son preference as land rights improve, ostensibly to ensure a male heir to inherit land. Consistent with this, girls with firstborn brothers also experience increased survival, but not girls with firstborn sisters. The gender bias manifests both in infant mortality rates and the sex ratio at birth.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Bhalotra","given":"Sonia","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Chakravarty","given":"Abhishek","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Mookherjee","given":"Dilip","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Pino","given":"Francisco J.","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"American Economic Journal: Applied Economics","id":"ITEM-1","issue":"2","issued":{"date-parts":[["2019"]]},"page":"205-237","title":"Property Rights and Gender Bias: Evidence from Land Reform in West Bengal","type":"article-journal","volume":"11"},"uris":["http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=0894d3ee-6bc7-4d48-b903-be1c91c383df"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"(Bhalotra et al. 2019)","manualFormatting":"Bhalotra et al. (2019)","plainTextFormattedCitation":"(Bhalotra et al. 2019)","previouslyFormattedCitation":"(Bhalotra et al. 2019)"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}Bhalotra et al. (2019) muestran a su vez que las reformas de tenencia de la tierra tienen efectos positivos sobre la sobrevivencia de los niños no primogénitos, ya que la mejora en los derechos de propiedad sobre la tierra intensifica la preferencia por un niño primogénito y estos actúan como seguro. Este es un efecto importante cuando se toma en cuenta los efectos heterogéneos que podría haber tenido la reforma agraria en Chile. Este proyecto busca abordar la economía política de la reforma agraria. Se busca explorar la segunda parte de la hipótesis de Engerman y Sokoloff, en el sentido de ver si la reforma agraria desconcentró el sistema político. Antes de ver ese efecto, es necesario que testemos si la reforma agraria fue implementada diferenciadamente según la cercanía política de los terratenientes con la clase política. Otros estudios muestran que entre más concentrado es el sistema político, peores son los resultados de desarrollo. En esos casos se mide concentración del sistema político usando como variable proxy la autocorrelación en los nombres de los alcaldes electos. Esta forma de medir concentración del sistema político es un avance, pero no mide la relación entre elites agrícolas y el sistema político. Nosotros proponemos construir un network entre políticos y terratenientes ya que tenemos los nombres de los candidatos (no solo los electos) y los terratenientes (de los registros de expropiación), y usar las medidas de centralidad de un agrícola en el network como un proxy de su acceso al sistema político. Con esta variable, podemos testear si aquellos terratenientes que son más centrales en el network fueron más o menos propensos a ser expropiados. Usando el network también podemos explorar otras preguntas. Tomando en cuenta la centralidad de los terratenientes, podemos ver si al haber expropiación, podemos preguntarnos si esta afectó la concentración total del sistema político, y si eso tiene un efecto sobre población en términos de desarrollo económico. Para esto es necesario comparar municipios cuyos networks fueron más o menos perturbados por las expropiaciones, y compararemos la evolución de estos antes y después de la dictadura. Referencias: ADDIN Mendeley Bibliography CSL_BIBLIOGRAPHY Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, y James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”. The American Economic Review 91 (5): 1369–1401. Bardhan, Pranab, Michael Luca, Dilip Mookherjee, y Francisco Pino. 2014. “Evolution of land distribution in West Bengal 1967-2004: Role of land reform and demographic changes”. Journal of Development Economics 110: 171–90. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.02.001. Bellisario, Antonio. 2007a. “The Chilean Agrarian Transformation: Agrarian Reform and Capitalist ‘Partial’ Counter-Agrarian Reform, 1964-1980. Part 2: CORA, Post-1980 Outcomes and the Emerging Agrarian Class Structure”. Journal of Agrarian Change 7 (2): 145–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2007.00138.x. ———. 2007b. “The Chilean Agrarian Transformation: Agrarian Reform and Capitalist ‘Partial’ Counter-Agrarian Reform, 1964-1980. Part 1: Reformism, Socialism and Free-Market Neoliberalism”. Journal of Agrarian Change 7 (2): 1–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2007.00143.x. Bhalotra, Sonia, Abhishek Chakravarty, Dilip Mookherjee, y Francisco J. Pino. 2019. “Property Rights and Gender Bias: Evidence from Land Reform in West Bengal”. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 11 (2): 205–37. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20160262. Bruhn, Miriam, y Francisco A. Gallego. 2012. “Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial Activities: Do They Matter for Economic Development?” Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (2): 433–61. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00218. Engerman, Stanley L, y Kenneth L Sokoloff. 1997. “Factor endowments, institutions, and differential paths of growth among new world economies”. How Latin America Fell Behind. https://doi.org/10.3386/h0066. Garrido R., José, Cristián Guerrero Y., y María Soledad Valdés. 1988. Historia de la reforma agraria en Chile. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria. Lillo Bustos, Nicolás A. 2018. “Land Redistribution and Crop Choice: Evidence from Reform and Counter-Reform in Chile”. Sokoloff, Kenneth L., y Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. “History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (3): 217–32. Welch Jr., Richard E. 1985. Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution 1959-1961. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. [1] Las hectáreas de riego básico correspondían a una hectárea física ponderada por el tipo de suelo en términos de irrigación. El objetivo de usar esta medida era redistribuir tierras de igual calidad.