Tratamiento dogmático de las "conductas neutrales" en la teoría de la intervención delictiva.

This article examines the challenge that the treatment of so-called neutral conduct poses for criminal law theory, where such conduct contributes to the causal chain of a crime committed by another person. It argues for the introduction of the notion of a unique sense of integration into shared wrongdoing as a key analytical concept for distinguishing those contributions that constitute participation in a jointly committed offence from conduct that lacks a socially meaningful and unequivocally criminal character. To this end, the article reconstructs the current state of the doctrinal debate and the traditional theories concerning the basis of accomplice liability, adopts a unitary account of criminal participation, and develops a set of guiding criteria that give content to this unique sense of integration - namely, the breach of duties of care or responsibility, the capacity of criminal prohibitions to enhance the protection of legally protected goods, alignment with the principal offender’s subsequent criminal plan, and criminal imminence as an indicator of such integration-. In this way, the proposal delineates, on the one hand, a scope of lawful freedom that prevents the mere knowledge of another’s criminal intent from unduly restricting the exchange of goods and services, and, on the other hand, a scope of prohibition defined by the participant’s concrete shaping of social reality, in which the contribution is regarded as legally blameworthy.