Sócrates: gesto y palabra política

The main thesis of this paper is that for Socrates political virtue is accom-plished exclusively in the sphere of pure language or gesture. The argu-ment consists of three parts. First, following on from the lectures entitled What is Called Thinking?, I examine Heidegger’s interpretation of the fig-ure of Socrates in relation to the themes of language and gesture. Follow-ing on from this analysis, I remark that Heidegger overlooks important aspects of Socrates’ understanding of the relation between political virtue and speech. Subsequently, based on the analysis of a central passage from Plato's Apolog y, I argue that virtue requires the public communicability of speech, and that it imposes itself over language and gestures as a principle of action that precedes and exceeds conceptual knowledge. Finally, I con-clude by stating that political power is restricted to the medium of lan-guage, to what language itself does or says.