Relaxed optimization models for spectrum auctions

Carlos Agualimpia-Arriaga; Carlos Adrian Correa-Florez; Carlos Ivan Paez Rueda

doi:10.1109/ANDESCON50619.2020.9272056

Relaxed optimization models for spectrum auctions

Carlos Agualimpia-Arriaga, Carlos Adrian Correa-Florez, Carlos Ivan Paez Rueda

Department of Electronic Engineering

Universidad Javeriana

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper compares optimization models in the context of spectrum auctions as a valid mechanism for the resources allocation in telecommunications. Relaxation algorithms are designed to implement the auction. This approach maximizes the revenue, subject to interference and market constraints. The market is modeled on three different types of behavior, namely: normal, conservative and aggressive. In addition to the revenue, the paper presents the spectrum utilization and price as part of the results. It has been concluded that the spectrum allocation offers tools to the auctioneer and the bidder to make decisions driven at maximizing the revenue.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2020 IEEE ANDESCON, ANDESCON 2020
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)	9781728193656
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ANDESCON50619.2020.9272056
State	Published - 13 Oct 2020
Event	2020 IEEE ANDESCON, ANDESCON 2020 - Quito, Ecuador Duration: 13 Oct 2020 → 16 Oct 2020

Publication series

Name	2020 IEEE ANDESCON, ANDESCON 2020

Conference

Conference	2020 IEEE ANDESCON, ANDESCON 2020
Country/Territory	Ecuador
City	Quito
Period	13/10/20 → 16/10/20

Keywords

Interference constraints
Market constraints
Resource allocation
Revenue maximization
Spectrum auctions

Access to Document

10.1109/ANDESCON50619.2020.9272056

Cite this

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title = "Relaxed optimization models for spectrum auctions",

abstract = "This paper compares optimization models in the context of spectrum auctions as a valid mechanism for the resources allocation in telecommunications. Relaxation algorithms are designed to implement the auction. This approach maximizes the revenue, subject to interference and market constraints. The market is modeled on three different types of behavior, namely: normal, conservative and aggressive. In addition to the revenue, the paper presents the spectrum utilization and price as part of the results. It has been concluded that the spectrum allocation offers tools to the auctioneer and the bidder to make decisions driven at maximizing the revenue.",

keywords = "Interference constraints, Market constraints, Resource allocation, Revenue maximization, Spectrum auctions",

author = "Carlos Agualimpia-Arriaga and Correa-Florez, {Carlos Adrian} and Rueda, {Carlos Ivan Paez}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 IEEE.; 2020 IEEE ANDESCON, ANDESCON 2020 ; Conference date: 13-10-2020 Through 16-10-2020",

year = "2020",

month = oct,

day = "13",

doi = "10.1109/ANDESCON50619.2020.9272056",

language = "English",

series = "2020 IEEE ANDESCON, ANDESCON 2020",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

booktitle = "2020 IEEE ANDESCON, ANDESCON 2020",

address = "United States",

}

Relaxed optimization models for spectrum auctions. / Agualimpia-Arriaga, Carlos; Correa-Florez, Carlos Adrian; Rueda, Carlos Ivan Paez.
2020 IEEE ANDESCON, ANDESCON 2020. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2020. 9272056 (2020 IEEE ANDESCON, ANDESCON 2020).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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AU - Rueda, Carlos Ivan Paez

PY - 2020/10/13

Y1 - 2020/10/13

N2 - This paper compares optimization models in the context of spectrum auctions as a valid mechanism for the resources allocation in telecommunications. Relaxation algorithms are designed to implement the auction. This approach maximizes the revenue, subject to interference and market constraints. The market is modeled on three different types of behavior, namely: normal, conservative and aggressive. In addition to the revenue, the paper presents the spectrum utilization and price as part of the results. It has been concluded that the spectrum allocation offers tools to the auctioneer and the bidder to make decisions driven at maximizing the revenue.

AB - This paper compares optimization models in the context of spectrum auctions as a valid mechanism for the resources allocation in telecommunications. Relaxation algorithms are designed to implement the auction. This approach maximizes the revenue, subject to interference and market constraints. The market is modeled on three different types of behavior, namely: normal, conservative and aggressive. In addition to the revenue, the paper presents the spectrum utilization and price as part of the results. It has been concluded that the spectrum allocation offers tools to the auctioneer and the bidder to make decisions driven at maximizing the revenue.

KW - Interference constraints

KW - Market constraints

KW - Resource allocation

KW - Revenue maximization

KW - Spectrum auctions

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PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

T2 - 2020 IEEE ANDESCON, ANDESCON 2020

Y2 - 13 October 2020 through 16 October 2020

ER -

Relaxed optimization models for spectrum auctions

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Keywords

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