Políticos mentirosos y tramposos democráticos: ¿Es la mentira política diferente a otras clases de mentiras?

In this article, I defend the idea that there are important differences be-tween lying in politics and lying in general. My aim is to show that the issues with political lies do not have to do only with metaphysical or con-ceptual questions regarding what politics is or what the concept of the political means, or only with the validity of the excuses and justifications commonly offered in favor of political liars. I hold that the political lie is a special form of lie due, first, to the peculiarity of the use of language in politics, and second, to the function that political lies play in politi-cal discussions: they undermine several epistemic conditions needed to impartially discuss social disagreements. In this work, however, I leave unanswered the question of what might be the best way to account for the epistemic conditions of democratic political discussions.