Observability and lying

Tilman Fries; Uri Gneezy; Agne Kajackaite; Daniel Parra

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.038

Observability and lying

Tilman Fries
, Uri Gneezy
, Agne Kajackaite
, Daniel Parra

WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Rady School of Management
University of Amsterdam

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

22 Scopus citations

Abstract

Experimental participants in a cheating game draw a random number and then report any number they wish, receiving a monetary payoff based only on the report. We study how these reports depend on the level of observability of both the random draw and the report by the experimenter. Our results show that whereas increasing the observability of the random draw decreases cheating, increasing the anonymity of the reports does not affect average reports.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	132-149
Number of pages	18
Journal	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume	189
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.038
State	Published - Sep 2021
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Cheating
Double blind
Laboratory experiment
Lying
Observability
Social image

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.038

Cite this

@article{bfd13555a191444690793b78a1552c2a,

title = "Observability and lying",

abstract = "Experimental participants in a cheating game draw a random number and then report any number they wish, receiving a monetary payoff based only on the report. We study how these reports depend on the level of observability of both the random draw and the report by the experimenter. Our results show that whereas increasing the observability of the random draw decreases cheating, increasing the anonymity of the reports does not affect average reports.",

keywords = "Cheating, Double blind, Laboratory experiment, Lying, Observability, Social image",

author = "Tilman Fries and Uri Gneezy and Agne Kajackaite and Daniel Parra",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021",

year = "2021",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.038",

language = "English",

volume = "189",

pages = "132--149",

journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization",

issn = "0167-2681",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Observability and lying

AU - Fries, Tilman

AU - Gneezy, Uri

AU - Kajackaite, Agne

AU - Parra, Daniel

PY - 2021/9

Y1 - 2021/9

N2 - Experimental participants in a cheating game draw a random number and then report any number they wish, receiving a monetary payoff based only on the report. We study how these reports depend on the level of observability of both the random draw and the report by the experimenter. Our results show that whereas increasing the observability of the random draw decreases cheating, increasing the anonymity of the reports does not affect average reports.

AB - Experimental participants in a cheating game draw a random number and then report any number they wish, receiving a monetary payoff based only on the report. We study how these reports depend on the level of observability of both the random draw and the report by the experimenter. Our results show that whereas increasing the observability of the random draw decreases cheating, increasing the anonymity of the reports does not affect average reports.

KW - Cheating

KW - Double blind

KW - Laboratory experiment

KW - Lying

KW - Observability

KW - Social image

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85110180410

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.038

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.038

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85110180410

SN - 0167-2681

VL - 189

SP - 132

EP - 149

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

ER -

Observability and lying

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this