Abstract
Chalmers’ (1996) zombie argument against physicalism (or ‘materialism’) about (phenomenal) consciousness supposes that every property of a composed physical system supervenes (logically) on the system’s fundamental constituents. In this paper, I discuss the significance of this supposition and I show that the philosophy of physics provides good grounds to resist it. As a result, I conclude that the zombie argument does not rule out a physicalist view of consciousness that conceives it as emergent in the sense of S-emergence (Howard, 2007). I finish by discussing some objections.
| Translated title of the contribution | Microphysicalism and the scope of the zombie argument |
|---|---|
| Original language | Spanish |
| Pages (from-to) | 45-64 |
| Journal | Estudios de Filosofía |
| Issue number | 59 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2019 |
Keywords
- philosophy of mind
- zombie argument
- phenomenal consciousness
- physicalism
- emergence
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