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Microfisicalismo y el alcance del argumento del zombi

Translated title of the contribution: Microphysicalism and the scope of the zombie argument

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Chalmers’ (1996) zombie argument against physicalism (or ‘materialism’) about (phenomenal) consciousness supposes that every property of a composed physical system supervenes (logically) on the system’s fundamental constituents. In this paper, I discuss the significance of this supposition and I show that the philosophy of physics provides good grounds to resist it. As a result, I conclude that the zombie argument does not rule out a physicalist view of consciousness that conceives it as emergent in the sense of S-emergence (Howard, 2007). I finish by discussing some objections.
Translated title of the contributionMicrophysicalism and the scope of the zombie argument
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)45-64
JournalEstudios de Filosofía
Issue number59
DOIs
StatePublished - 2019

Keywords

  • philosophy of mind
  • zombie argument
  • phenomenal consciousness
  • physicalism
  • emergence

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