@inproceedings{807a221493c945b2bb905099c072ce0f,
title = "Local requirements for optimal distribution of heterogeneous agents",
abstract = "This paper introduces an analytical framework for the study of a generic distribution problem where a group of heterogeneous agents intend to divide themselves into various subgroups without any form of global information-sharing or centralized decision-making. Subgroups are associated to mathematical functions that capture the marginal utilities of performing tasks, each satisfying the law of diminishing returns. We prove that under generic local requirements a stable agent distribution representing a Nash equilibrium can be achieved, and show via Monte Carlo simulations how the proposed set of rules performs under varying constraints on information flow and degrees of cooperation.",
author = "Nogales, {Juan M.} and Jorge Finke",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1109/CDC.2011.6161376",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781612848006",
series = "Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",
pages = "3596--3601",
booktitle = "2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011",
address = "United States",
note = "2011 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC 2011 ; Conference date: 12-12-2011 Through 15-12-2011",
}