Interpretación del régimen de reservas en tratados internacionales y sesgos cognitivos. Nuevos enfoques

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (CV) represents one of its most complex sections from the legal interpretation standpoint. The question this Note seeks to answer is the following one: why do States ultimately behave as they do when formulating reservations and accepting or objecting (to) them? In trying to answer this question, we suggest that the International Law Commission (ILC) may be benefitted from behavioral economics approaches, thereby reducing the negative impacts that the current legal reservations regime represents vis-à-vis public international law. This review Note is the result of an ongoing research project on contemporary international law and puts forth a working hypothesis by which we state that the current reservations legal regime is both complex and weak, and therefore, that the ILC could take into account some findings of behavioral economics for the purpose of harmonizing legal interpretations dealing with reservations.