Integración vertical y contratos gerenciales: Herramientas estratégicas en mercados imperfectos

Flavio Jácome Liévano; Andrés Mejía Villa; Karen Mendoza Manjarrés

Integración vertical y contratos gerenciales: Herramientas estratégicas en mercados imperfectos

Translated title of the contribution: Vertical integration management contracts: Strategic tools in imperfect markets

Flavio Jácome Liévano
, Andrés Mejía Villa
, Karen Mendoza Manjarrés

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper analyzes a Bertrand competition model with differentiated goods, in order to determine optimal decisions when the owners can use vertical integration and managerial contracts as strategic tools. The equilibrium results are: i) the owners always delegate control to a manager who is encouraged to be less aggressive in sales; ii) there is no vertical integration when goods are highly homogeneous. iii) social welfare is never the highest that can be achieved.

Translated title of the contribution	Vertical integration management contracts: Strategic tools in imperfect markets
Original language	Spanish
Pages (from-to)	127-156
Number of pages	30
Journal	Revista de Economia Institucional
Volume	16
Issue number	31
State	Published - 2014
Externally published	Yes

Cite this

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title = "Integraci{\'o}n vertical y contratos gerenciales: Herramientas estrat{\'e}gicas en mercados imperfectos",

abstract = "This paper analyzes a Bertrand competition model with differentiated goods, in order to determine optimal decisions when the owners can use vertical integration and managerial contracts as strategic tools. The equilibrium results are: i) the owners always delegate control to a manager who is encouraged to be less aggressive in sales; ii) there is no vertical integration when goods are highly homogeneous. iii) social welfare is never the highest that can be achieved.",

keywords = "Bertrand competition, Differentiated goods, Managerial contracts, Nash equilibrium, Vertical integration",

author = "Li{\'e}vano, \{Flavio J{\'a}come\} and Villa, \{Andr{\'e}s Mej{\'i}a\} and Manjarr{\'e}s, \{Karen Mendoza\}",

year = "2014",

language = "Espa{\~n}ol ",

volume = "16",

pages = "127--156",

journal = "Revista de Economia Institucional",

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publisher = "Universidad Externado de Colombia",

number = "31",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Integración vertical y contratos gerenciales

T2 - Herramientas estratégicas en mercados imperfectos

AU - Liévano, Flavio Jácome

AU - Villa, Andrés Mejía

AU - Manjarrés, Karen Mendoza

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - This paper analyzes a Bertrand competition model with differentiated goods, in order to determine optimal decisions when the owners can use vertical integration and managerial contracts as strategic tools. The equilibrium results are: i) the owners always delegate control to a manager who is encouraged to be less aggressive in sales; ii) there is no vertical integration when goods are highly homogeneous. iii) social welfare is never the highest that can be achieved.

AB - This paper analyzes a Bertrand competition model with differentiated goods, in order to determine optimal decisions when the owners can use vertical integration and managerial contracts as strategic tools. The equilibrium results are: i) the owners always delegate control to a manager who is encouraged to be less aggressive in sales; ii) there is no vertical integration when goods are highly homogeneous. iii) social welfare is never the highest that can be achieved.

KW - Bertrand competition

KW - Differentiated goods

KW - Managerial contracts

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Vertical integration

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84919343223

M3 - Artículo

AN - SCOPUS:84919343223

SN - 0124-5996

VL - 16

SP - 127

EP - 156

JO - Revista de Economia Institucional

JF - Revista de Economia Institucional

IS - 31

ER -

Integración vertical y contratos gerenciales: Herramientas estratégicas en mercados imperfectos

Abstract

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