El concepto de verdad en gadamer y brandom: Presupuestos para la construcción de teorías en la ciencia del derecho

The objective of this article is to determine the epistemic role of truth in the construction of theories in the science of Law, based on the need to explain the rational and reasonable nature of the reasons for structuring a scientific discourse. German Sucar, in Nature of Law and Legal Truth, locates an epistemic starting point for such construction, whose purpose is to offer a limited plane in which some inexcusable elements converge for the construction of a theory in general and in particular, for the science of Law. To support this thesis and meet the stated objective, we have focused on the work of Robert Brandom, faithful to the inferential theory that provides the necessary epistemic elements to understand how to justify a theory on the limits of language and characteristics of rationality and reasonableness; and of Hans-Georg Gadamer, faithful to the hermeneutic theory that supports the closeness between language and truth as epistemology, within the rational / reasonable set. This text is divided into five parts. At first, the problem of truth arises and how it has been treated from different theoretical constructions. In this section, we emphasize pro-orational theories and hermeneutic theories of truth. Second, supported by the evident closeness of the thought of Gadamer and Brandom, we face the problem of whether in the thinking of these two philosophers there is a theory of truth, that is, what epistemic status the ideas of these thinkers have about the truth for the construction of a theory in the science of Law. Third, the concept of truth is presented in Gadamer's thought. Fourth, the concept of truth in Brandom's thinking is presented. Finally, the problem that guides this research is addressed by focusing on the convergences that pragmatist thinking has over the hermeneutic.