A note on “Evolution of Preferences”

Oliver Pardo

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.05.005

A note on “Evolution of Preferences”

Oliver Pardo

Department of Business

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

A surprising result in Dekel et al. (2007) states that strict Nash equilibria might cease to be evolutionary stable when agents are able to observe a signal that fully reveals the opponent's preferences, even if the frequency of the signal is very low. I show that when the signal a player receives on her opponent's preferences is almost uninformative, all strict Nash equilibria are evolutionary stable, no matter the frequency of the signal.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	129-134
Number of pages	6
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	71
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.05.005
State	Published - Aug 2017

Keywords

Efficiency
Evolution of Preferences
Indirect evolutionary approach

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.05.005

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title = "A note on “Evolution of Preferences”",

abstract = "A surprising result in Dekel et al. (2007) states that strict Nash equilibria might cease to be evolutionary stable when agents are able to observe a signal that fully reveals the opponent's preferences, even if the frequency of the signal is very low. I show that when the signal a player receives on her opponent's preferences is almost uninformative, all strict Nash equilibria are evolutionary stable, no matter the frequency of the signal.",

keywords = "Efficiency, Evolution of Preferences, Indirect evolutionary approach",

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note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2017",

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AB - A surprising result in Dekel et al. (2007) states that strict Nash equilibria might cease to be evolutionary stable when agents are able to observe a signal that fully reveals the opponent's preferences, even if the frequency of the signal is very low. I show that when the signal a player receives on her opponent's preferences is almost uninformative, all strict Nash equilibria are evolutionary stable, no matter the frequency of the signal.

KW - Efficiency

KW - Evolution of Preferences

KW - Indirect evolutionary approach

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85033395907

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DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.05.005

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85033395907

SN - 0304-4068

VL - 71

SP - 129

EP - 134

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

ER -

A note on “Evolution of Preferences”

Abstract

Keywords

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